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Introduction:  
Beyond the Human 
Human beings were at first (kat’ arkhas) similar (paraplēsios) to a different 
animal (heteron zōon), i.e. to a fish (ikhthys).  (Anaximander) 
 
It must be thought that things that are born ensouled (empsykha) belong to the 
same race (homogenē).  (Pythagoras) 
 
Earth and water are everything that comes into being and grows.  
   (Xenophanes) 
 
And he teaches the origin of the things that are born and are destroyed, all the 
way to  the parts of animals.  (Parmenides) 
 
 
In the late 1950s, coincidentally around the same time, Guthrie and Have-
lock provided the first extensive discussions of Presocratic theories about life’s 
origin and its development into multiple forms. They touched on essential as-
pects of such theories, but also inaugurated an influential line of interpretation, 
focusing on the human, that this book aims to rectify. Havelock remarked on the 
continuity of all organic life, underscoring that while plants are “the prototype 
of all organic life . . . man is not merely just an animal, but ultimately a variant 
of a plant.” In commenting on Anaxagoras he also emphasized the centrality of 
nature and the “equality” intrinsic in its creations, calling attention to “the pro-
tean capacity of an elemental nature to evolve all-various forms of life, from the 
sunflower to the scientist.”1 In other words, for Havelock, interpreter of the 
Presocratics,2 one should see “evolution” in a sunflower as well as in a scientist, 
-------------------------------------------- 
Throughout the book, ancient fragments and testimonia are identified with both the DK number-
ing and the numbering of textual units collected in the “Sources” section of this volume. Such con-
cordances are expressed by the formula DK (=), e.g. DK 21 B 29 (= 06.02). When a given doxogra-
pher is mentioned in the main text (or that of the footnote), he or she will appear in the system of 
identification of the footnote DK/ (=), e.g. DK 12 A 11/Hippol. Ref. 1.6.6 (= 03.02). In addition, the 
section “Sources” includes also the concordances with the Loeb edition of the Early Greek Philoso-
phers by André Laks and Glenn Most, from which, when not otherwise indicated, all translations of 
the ancient evidence are taken. 
1 Havelock 1957, 109-10, 111. 
2 Havelock devotes a chapter to the Presocratics (1957, 104-124) within a larger project that aims 
at showing the presence of liberalism in ancient Greek political thought. Harshly criticized by 
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for they are “equally” complex forms of life. On the other hand, Guthrie re-
viewed the several instances of Anaximander’s theory that life originated from 
earth and water heated by the sun and its progression to Aristotle’s theory of 
spontaneous generation,3 and he too, like Havelock, stressed “the idea of kinship 
of all life” in Presocratic thought.4 But Guthrie and Havelock did not pursue this 
fundamental notion by investigating how (or whether) it affected the Presocratic 
conceptions of the different forms of life within the framework of their inquiry 
into nature. In other words, was such a “kinship”5 among living beings actually 
operative for the Presocratics “still now,” in all forms of life in the way an ani-
mal, a plant, or a human reproduces itself, senses the world and lives in it? And, 
even more importantly, was the notion of a common, natural origin for all living 
beings representative and, at the same time, foundational of a certain idea on 
living beings and life that characterized the Presocratics’ inquiry into nature?   
Neglecting this inquisitive path, which would clarify the Presocratics’ mode 
of thought and integrate the nature of the extant evidence,6 Havelock and Guth-
rie instead pursued their own interests in the human.7 They remained, so to 
speak, close to Plato, whom we will soon discuss. And, in doing so, they turned 
-------------------------------------------- 
Strauss (1959, 390-439) and subsequently neglected by scholarship, despite his Pindaric flights 
Havelock has pinpointed some crucial aspects of the Presocratics’ understanding of life. In addition 
to the kinship of life, these elements include the importance of the plant as a model for understand-
ing other manifestations of life, and the relevance of animal bodies and their organs as “natural” 
outgrowths and as determinant—in the case of the hands—in providing the development of human 
intelligence. 
3 See Aristotle’s History of Animals (3.539a17-25) and Generation of Animals (5.762a8-35). 
4 Guthrie 1957, 46-62. 
5 The notion of kinship with which Havelock and Guthrie have interpreted the Presocratics’ ac-
count of the origin of living beings is explicitly found in the testimonies that refer to Pythagoras and 
Empedocles (see DK 14.8a (= 05.08) (for Pythagoras) and DK 31 B 136 (= 10.63) (for Pythagoras 
and Empedocles). In the first case, we find the adjective homogenēs to qualify all ensouled beings; 
in the second, syggenēs is attached to the irrational animals (aloga zōa) in relation to humans. In his 
discussion of the two basic mechanisms of sensation, Theophrastus goes even further and considers 
everything that a living being senses by like “a kin” (ta syggenē), see Thph. de Sens. 1 (= 0.4). Even 
if the idea of kinship is not accounted for in the testimonies of other Presocratics (besides Pythago-
ras and Empedocles), it is still legitimate to discuss living beings in terms of kinship inasmuch as 
they all share the same physical origin. For the “elemental” basis of living beings’ kinship in Empe-
docles, see Balaudé 1997, 33-37. 
6 In fact, so far, rather than being tied to the question of animals’ origin and kinship and to the 
Presocratics’ overall interest in the living world, different aspects of animals’ life such as perception 
and reproduction have been left to discipline-bound and “subject-focused” discussions. On 
Presocratic theories of perception in general, see, for instance, Mansfeld 1996, 158-88, Caston 2015, 
29-37, Rudolph 2015, 36-53; on Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Empedocles, Mansfeld 1999, 326-46; 
on Empedocles, see Long 1966, 256-76; on Democritus, Sassi 1978, Rudolph 2011, 67-83; on re-
production, see, for instance, Kember 1971, 70-9, on physiological processes, including sense per-
ception and reproduction, Longrigg 1993, 53-97.  
7 Havelock is interested in the connection of human progress with political liberalism, and 
emblematically calls the physiologoi, whose theories he discusses, “anthropologists” (1957, 104-24). 
Guthrie, on the other hand, is interested in following the transition from myth to reason. In the chap-
ter titled “Kinship of Life,” he makes Pythagoras the major representative of this outlook on life on 
account of his doctrine of the soul, but does not pursue the consequences such a doctrine had for a 
comprehension of the different forms of life as related in this life (1957, 58-9). 
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the kinship of life into a marginal notion which, attached to the vision of a 
common primordial origin, did not become central to their interpretations of the 
Presocratics’ inquiry into life and its forms, and had no relevance to or impact 
on scholarship’s subsequent understanding of the Presocratics’ conception of 
actual living beings. In this way, these authors privileged the human, transfer-
ring it back to the center it had occupied for the poets (Homer and Hesiod),8 and 
obscuring the Presocratic mode of thought this book wants to restore and bring 
back to light.  
Havelock and Guthrie have not been alone: the anthropocentric approach 
continues to characterize more recent studies. In her discussion of ancient Greek 
and Roman theories about human civilization, Blundell defines Anaximander’s 
view of the origin of life as “one of the most bizarre of his theories” and artifi-
cially extracts from Empedocles’ zoogonies an anthropogony that traces “the 
rise of the human race.”9 More recently, Lloyd, preoccupied with explaining 
what defines humans vis-à-vis the other animals and with tracing the shifting 
boundaries of that definition, adopts Vernant’s view of Greek sacrifice. Animal 
sacrifice was an institutionalized practice of the polis that asserted a gulf be-
tween humans and animals and was instrumental in restoring a temporary, rit-
ual-dependent communion between gods and men. In his discussion, Lloyd de-
votes only a short paragraph to the dissenting voice of the philosophers: he 
makes cursory mentions of Pythagoras and Empedocles in relation to the trans-
migration of the soul and remarks (as Havelock and Guthrie did) on the “kinship 
of life” entailed by the transmigration concept.10 But Pythagoras and Empedo-
cles were not the only “dissidents”. The human/animal alterity on which Greek 
sacrifice was founded did not fit the other Presocratics either. On the other hand, 
still interested in the human and pursuing the subjective, aprioristic nature of 
any understanding of the human/animal relation, Osborne sees Anaxagoras and 
Democritus as marking differences between us and the animals and interprets 
the thought of Empedocles and Pythagoras as extending the “human soul” and 
its cognitive abilities to the other animals. The way we perceive other forms of 
-------------------------------------------- 
8 Both Homer and Hesiod celebrated a world of gods or heroes at whose center sat the human be-
ing. Hesiod’s cosmogony constituted a divine genealogy whose final establishment mirrored human 
society and its values, founding them, while the gods were human projections. As for Homer, his 
similes adopted (and adapted) the natural world to telescope the existence of heroes into a cosmic 
and often inexorable dimension. In this respect, Clarke remarks that animal similes in Homer are 
based on the recognition that men and beasts do not belong to “different departments of the crea-
tion,” and that they share physical, emotional and cognitive apparatuses, as well as the same range 
of emotions and drives (1995, 146). But while Homer used animal similes to clarify humans’ physi-
cal and emotional conditions, the Presocratics considered animals in themselves and adopted analo-
gies to show the interconnectedness relating their bodies and, so to speak, living capacities and, ul-
timately, lives. See chapters 2 and 4. 
9 Blundell 1986, 45. Elsewhere, the author recognizes that in many Presocratic “anthropogonies” 
humans were animals, but she is interested in pursuing how humans became fully rational beings 
(70-91). 
10 Lloyd 2012, 12. 
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life and our (human) position relative to them is not rooted in nature, but instead 
reflects our understanding of nature. Hence, according to this author, some 
Presocratics emphasized human/animal discontinuity (Anaxagoras and De-
mocritus), and others continuity (Pythagoras and Empedocles).11 The point on 
the subjective fluidity of the human/animal relation is well taken. But were 
Anaxagoras and Democritus really marking discontinuity between humans and 
the animals?12 And were Pythagoras and Empedocles extending to animals the 
human soul? In Osborne’s account, for these two authors animals should not be 
beaten or sacrificed because they could and might host a human soul (in the case 
of Pythagoras, that of a friend). But while regarding Pythagoras the assessment 
on the ultimate ownership of the soul may be ambiguous,13 the human soul is 
completely irrelevant to understanding Empedocles’ eschatological vision as 
well as his conception of the multiple forms of life.14 So the flexibility of the 
human/animal relation which Osborne points out, along with their continuity in 
Pythagoras and Empedocles’ doctrines, is still built on anthropocentric founda-
tions.  
This book takes a different approach than what seems to have become a 
dominant line of interpretation. Its goal is not to understand how the early Greek 
philosophers conceived of the human, perpetuating a fundamentally Platonic 
perspective. This book aims instead to capture how the early Greek philosophers 
understood the phenomenon of life in the context of their inquiry into nature,15 
-------------------------------------------- 
11 Osborne 2007, 43-54. 
12 As the discussion of the evidence below will make clear, for both Anaxagoras and Democritus 
it is more appropriate to speak of an articulation of differences that are grounded on the notion of 
human/animal continuity rather than to assert a radical discontinuity between human and animal 
forms of life; see chapter 2. 
13 According to Xenophanes’ testimony, Pythagoras claimed to recognize in the voice of the pup-
py the soul of a friend, but this leaves open the question as to the previous embodiments of that soul 
[DK 21 B 7 (= 06.08)]. 
14 Apart from the fact that Empedocles uses the notion of psykhē (soul) only once (DK 31 B 138, 
not listed in “Sources”), it is fundamental that we understand humans, on the one hand, and animals 
(and plants), on the other, as deriving from different combinations of the same elements.  
15 I take nature as encompassing the field of “becoming” (gignesthai) from a beginning until the 
present state of the world (and beyond), along with its “laws” and phenomena. There is a question in 
scholarship as to whether the early Greek philosophers were using a comprehensive notion of nature 
(physis) as we conceive of it nowadays. For instance, Macé (2011, 21-43; 2012, 47-84) [and before 
him Platzer (1993)] considers “nature” a developing notion that will sediment in the fourth century 
as a classifier for “natural things” and the world containing them, while in earlier writings, 
Presocratics’ included, these authors point out a semantic gap between physis and phyein. Physis 
does not indicate a process; rather, it has a distributive function and refers to the characteristics 
qualifying a given entity and differentiating it from the others [so in Parmenides, who however uses 
phyein for the sprouting of the sky, see DK 28 B 10 (= 09.08)]. Since Macé’s argument mainly rests 
on a discussion of literary sources with a focus on Parmenides and Anaxagoras, endorsing his posi-
tion would require a systematic analysis of physis, phyein, and their cognates in the extant evidence 
pertaining to all the Presocratics, but such an analysis is beyond the scope of this book. Here I use 
the notion of nature in the sense clarified above, namely as a field of reference for the processes, 
“laws,” and phenomena discussed by the early Greek philosophers. Whether or not there existed a 
comprehensive notion of physis from the outset of early Greek philosophy, already with Anaximan-
der the cosmological processes and likely processes that brought living beings into life were seen in 
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and, in turn, what type of human/animal relation this “physical” outlook on life 
decreed. It focuses on the Presocratics’ definition of animal life from a cosmo-
logical perspective, manifested in different, interrelated forms—including hu-
man beings—and conjoined with an emerging environment which animal life 
ultimately helps to organize, to which it is vitally connected and in which it 
thrives and subsists. In other words, this book pursues the interrelatedness 
among forms of life (humans, animals, and plants) that was inherent in the 
Presocratics’ conception of a common origin for all living beings and their be-
lief that some of them (e.g., the human and likely the other land animals) came 
about from a transformation from another kind. And it shows that, far from be-
ing an “historical” notion, this interrelatedness was still effective in the way the 
Presocratics conceived of the current relation among living beings and the dif-
ferences between kinds. 
For although the information is fragmented, its abundance indicates the 
presence in Presocratic philosophy of a discourse on living beings whose 
boundaries—given the nature of the evidence—are difficult to ascertain, but 
whose coextensiveness with the Presocratic inquiry into nature cannot be de-
nied. Whatever specific inquisitive inclination or theory any given Presocratic 
may have had, the extant evidence—at least regarding the major thinkers—
shows a distinctive interest in understanding life in its multiformity (plants in-
cluded) and phenomena. It also highlights the Presocratics’ effort to relate dif-
ferent life manifestations to one another, and, in turn, to the cosmos. And even 
more importantly, it does so without pursuing a polarity between humans and 
the other animals (which will become apparent in subsequent philosophical 
thought) and without the teleological outlook often inherent in such a polarity.16 
The dominion of logos (reason) as a standard of value for life and its forms was 
yet to come.  
A radical shift occurred indeed with Plato, and on that point there is perhaps 
no better testimony than Socrates’ famous intellectual biography in Phaedo. In 
this dialogue, which somehow chronicles his last hours, Socrates reveals that in 
his youth he was an avid student of nature. Like the early Greek philosophers, 
-------------------------------------------- 
terms of phyein. For the Milesian used periphyein associated to plant imagery (phloion) to express 
the process leading to the formation of sun, moon, and stars [DK 12 A 10 (= 03.01)].  Further, 
phyein was also likely involved in the process that led to the origin of the first animals inasmuch as 
Anaximander described them as “born” in moisture and surrounded by a thorny bark (phloion) that 
eventually broke [DK 12 A 30 (= 03.03); for the use of phyein in the context of living beings’ ori-
gins, see DK 68 B 5.2 (= 21.11)]. Thus, if we can rely on these testimonies, at the outset of early 
Greek philosophy phyein qualified a coming-into-being that was spontaneous, intrinsic to the subject 
of becoming, and prior to sexual reproduction. 
16 Subsequent philosophical thought (Socratic and Post-Socratic) focuses on the human being, his 
logos and virtue as disconnected from the study of the beginning (arkhē) conceived of in physical 
terms. For the meanings of arkhē in Presocratic philosophy and its relation with the equally funda-
mental technical notions of kosmos, physis, and logos, see Barnes 1987, 18-23. 
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discussed in this book, he dealt with the causes of generation and destruction 
and pondered why each thing existed. Significantly, in presenting the questions 
to which he struggled to find a solution, Socrates mentions the organized forma-
tion of animals’ bodies17 and the instrument of thinking. Were bodies caused by 
a phenomenon of fermentation (sēpedōn) involving hot and cold? Do people 
think with blood, air, or fire? Or with the brain?18 But this set of questions be-
longed to a juvenile and confusing research agenda that our Platonized Socrates 
abandoned in favor of a doctrine centered on the human soul and its eschato-
logical dimension to the detriment of the body and the realm of nature. While 
living, a philosopher should practice death, Socrates claims in Phaedo, a para-
dox he hurries to explain.19 With it he meant that a philosopher had to separate 
himself as much as possible from his body, from its desires and fears in order to 
focus on the soul’s reminiscences prior to the present embodiment. In this epis-
temological/eschatological perspective the inquiry into nature was useless and 
obsolete. Humans became the focus, and their life on this earth was a mere tool 
for the pursuit of wisdom and the recollection of the absolutes, while the body 
was considered a source of distraction from true knowledge and a prison. As for 
the life of the other animals, it became relevant to understand, and represent, the 
shortcomings and degeneration of the human soul that, in its embodiments, fell 
short of its ultimate goal.20 
To enable the separation between soul and body, the dominion of the one 
upon the other, and the practice of a philosophical life Plato’s Socrates came up 
with the notion of a partite soul, which triggered, in turn, a chain reaction of 
“charged” separations: of reason from other cognitive and vital activities (i.e. 
courage, sensations, desires), of the head from the other parts of the body, and 
of humans from the other animals. Life along with its forms and capacities be-
came rigidly hierarchical. Reason and the living being that possessed it (the hu-
man) triumphed. Not mentioned in Phaedo, which turns around the immortal 
(rational) soul, psychological partition is articulated in Timaeus21 and Repub-
lic.22 In both the soul emerges as a composite entity encompassing a ruling part, 
the rational (immortal) one, and two (mortal) subjected parts, the spirited and 
appetitive.23 In the Platonic corpus, Phaedo included, a number of eschatologi-
-------------------------------------------- 
17 Plat. Phaed. 96b (= 0.6). To describe the phenomenon of animals’ bodily organization Socrates 
uses the verb syntrephesthai, which indicates the growth of bodies by the composition of different 
substances (see LS s.v.  syntrephō). 
18 Plat. Phaed. 96b (= 0.7). 
19 Plat. Phaed. 64a. 
20 See, for instance, Plato’s Timaeus 91-92C (= 22.08), and the list of animals, from asses and 
similar beasts to ants and bees, in Phaedo (81e-82b). 
21 Tim. 69C-71D (= 22.06). 
22 Resp. 4.440-442d. 
23 The immortality and mortality of the soul’s parts are mentioned in Timaeus, not in Republic 4. 
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cal myths depicts the destiny of the immortal soul after death24 completing in 
this way an influential anthropology that, directed to transcend nature and the 
body and revolving around reason, was irreconcilable with the perspective and 
ideas on living beings and life held by the Presocratics. 
 
*** 
 
The living world the early Greek philosophers strove to account for was 
pristine, untouched by the ideological separations of Platonic imprint mentioned 
above. So instead of taking the human being as a paradigm for life, Anaximan-
der, the forerunner of the inquiry into the origin of life, is reported to have 
claimed that “human beings were at first similar to a different animal, i.e. to a 
fish.”25 He also claimed that “animals [zōa] were born by evaporation [exat-
mizomena] from the effects of the sun,” voicing a vision that revealed a funda-
mental connection of all living beings and that is emblematic of the Presocratic 
perspective on the living world.  
The idea that humans originally almost resembled (paraplēsios)26 fish may 
well have been peculiar to Anaximander, a primitive spark of evolutionist 
-------------------------------------------- 
24 See Plato’s Gorgias (523a-527a), Phaedo (81c-82c), Republic (10.617d-721d) and Phaedrus 
(246a-249d). 
25 DK 12 A 11/Hippol. Ref. 1.6.6 (= 03.02). 
26 Paraplēsios may be Hippolytus’ rendition for another expression originally used by Anaxi-
mander (the first literary attestation of this adjective is in the prose of the fifth century; see Hdt. 
1.202; 4.128; Thuc. 1.84). In Hippolytus’ testimony this adjective conveys both physical similarity 
and proximity of existence for fish and “early humans,” a situation that stems from the fact that liv-
ing beings share the same origin (= 03.02). Besides Hippolytus’, there are four other testimonies 
about Anaximander’s theory on the origin of living beings, three collected under DK 12 A 30 (= 
03.03, 03.04, 03.05), and one from Pseudo-Plutarch [Ps.-Plut. Strom. 2/12 A 10 (= 03.01)]. Despite 
their differences it seems safe to infer that for Anaximander life originated in a very remote time in 
an aquatic environment at a specific stage in the formation of the world (when the moistened earth 
was heated by the sun) and likely became differentiated while the world itself achieved definition 
via the drying up of the “wet lands” (see Kahn 1960, 68-9). While Hippolytus refers to the similarity 
between the early humans and fishes during this early stage (= 03.02), Pseudo-Plutarch (= 03.01) 
and Censorinus (4.7) (= 03.04) state that for Anaximander the human being was first begotten from 
animals of different form (ex alloeidōn zōōn) and fish respectively (sive pisces seu piscibus simil-
lima animalia), on account of its inability to nourish itself and therefore survive. In the case of the 
birth from fish, we are told that fishes carried inside themselves the human beings until puberty, at 
which point young men and women were delivered. On human beings’ birth from fish, see also Plu-
tarch’s ethnographic account [Plut. Quaest. Conv. 8.8.4 730E-F/DK 12 A 30 (= 03.06)]. From these 
sources we can draw two important considerations besides the picture delineated earlier. First, how-
ever outlandish the explanation that human beings were begotten from fishes, it shows a preoccupa-
tion with connecting life’s origin to its perpetuation. For in being unable to survive after birth, hu-
mans are also unable to reproduce themselves [significantly, in Censorinus human beings are said to 
be born ad pubertatem (at puberty)]. Second, in presenting the human being as originally resembling 
another living being (a fish), Hippolytus seems to picture an original phase in which nearly resem-
bling aquatic living beings coexisted (the ancestors of fishes and those of humans). Indeed, it is re-
markable that etymologically paraplēsios signifies “flowing by” (from para and plēō), which may 
render in Hippolytus’ words Anaximander’s vision of an early stage of life before the current, more 
definite differentiation (in terms of habitats, bodies and consequent ways of life) among living be-
ings. 
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thought that other Presocratics might not have shared.27 But besides the notion 
of evolution, what appears even more striking in this statement is Anaximan-
der’s willingness to consider humans on a pair with other living beings, pinpoint 
a common origin, and articulate differences via similarities. Indeed, if the hu-
man being was the product of a transformation from another living being (from 
which also stemmed the other forms of life), what differentiated it from the 
original living being and its transformations into other living beings was a com-
plex of differences resting, so to speak, on a shared core. In retracing the history 
of the natural world, many of the Presocratics who succeeded Anaximander 
started from the premise that humankind was one of the many forms of life 
stemming from the same phenomenon: moistened earth heated by the sun.28 In 
retracing that origin, they, like Anaximander, adopted a beyond-the-human ap-
proach and identified a system of “relations” based on commensurability. In the 
doxography we find the word symmetria (commensurability) used to describe 
distinct processes such as thought and smell, which were rooted in the natural 
constitution of animals’ bodies, sprung from their interactions with the envi-
ronment and were made possible by sharing a compatible constitution.29 But we 
could make an interpretive leap and expand the semantic capacity and applica-
bility of this notion by extending it to the way the Presocratics considered living 
beings’ existence in the world. Under the inquiry of the early Greek philoso-
phers animals were commensurate with the cosmos in terms of constituents and 
formation; and likewise, because of their ultimately shared origin and constitu-
tion, animals were commensurate with other animals in terms of habitats, ca-
-------------------------------------------- 
27 Archelaus and Democritus may have held, however, a similar position. The doxography indi-
cates that for Archelaus all animals (humans included) lived nourishing themselves with mud [DK 
60 A 4 (= 18.02)] while according to Democritus human beings “poured from the earth as worms” 
[DK 68 A 139 (= 21.13)]. Thus the removal from the earth and mud may have led to, or implied, a 
physical change for the original human beings. On the other hand, evolution may have been in-
volved also in the survival of the members of Empedocles’ second zoogony under Love, although in 
a different narrative than the one endorsed by Anaximander, Archelaus and Democritus [see DK 31 
B 60 (= 10.14) and DK 31 B 61 (= 10.15), along with Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Phys-
ics 2.198b27 (= 10.16); see chapter 2]. The evolutionist slant of Anaximander’s theory, remarked on 
by scholars (for instance Burnet 1945, 71), has been challenged by Loenen 1954, 128-32, Kahn 
1960, 112-3, and, more recently, Campbell 2014, 239-40, and Gregory 2016, 34-8.  
28 Censorinus adds further information and states that life originated ex aqua et terraque calefac-
tis (from water and earth heated by the sun) [4.7/DK 12 A 30 (= 03.04)].  
29 The word symmetria and its cognates appear in Theophrastus’ discussion of Parmenides’ no-
tion of thought, of Diogenes’ view of the mechanism of smell, in Plutarch’s account of Empedocles’ 
explanation of plants’ process of nutrition, and in a testimony about Democritus that relates to the 
soul [see, respectively, de Sens. 3/DK 28 A 46 (= 09.21), 41/DK 64 Α 19 (= 20.15), Plut. Quaest. 
conv. 3.2.2 649D/LM EMP. D248/cf. DK 31 ad B 77 (= 10.53), and 58/DK 68 A 35 (= 21.56)]. In 
addition, Theophrastus uses this notion to explain in Cleidemus’ theory the relation between plants’ 
nature and the seasons in which they sprout [DK 62.4 (= 19.03)]. In commenting on Theophrastus’ 
On the Senses, Stratton remarks that symmetria may represent a “due proportion of heat and cold, 
each to the other” or a “spatial correspondence” between the subject who perceives and the per-
ceived object (1917, 158, 169). It is therefore a notion that indicates a balanced relation either within 
the body (or the soul) or maintained between the animal’s body, on the one hand, and external ob-
jects and environmental conditions, on the other. 
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pacities, behaviors, and types of life.30 After Anaximander a decisive impetus 
toward the knowledge of life and its forms came with Alcmaeon and Par-
menides,31 who dealt with the process of animal reproduction and the physiol-
ogy of sensation and thought,32 and steadily continued with Empedocles, 
Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Diogenes of Apollonia, and Democritus.33 Because of 
the relative abundance of evidence, this book focuses on the later Pluralists 
(Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus) and on the eclectic Diogenes of 
Apollonia, but occasional references will be made to figures such as Heraclitus 
and Parmenides. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
30 In other words, what I call here “commensurability” is a strategy in the approach to the 
study of living beings that relies on their interrelatedness along with the cosmological perspective 
that frames it. It leads to a synchronous understanding of the different forms of life in terms of the 
array of conditions that characterize them, each in its kind (or species). Commensurability can be 
seen, for instance, in the systematic discussion of animals’ kinds in relation to the compatibility be-
tween their specific bodily constitution and the suitable living environment, with the consequent 
formation of habitats [see the testimonies regarding Empedocles and Democritus, DK 31 A 72 (= 
10.12); DK 68 B 5 (= 21.10); DK 68 B5.2 (= 21.11)]; in the systematic explanation of their different 
sensorial capacities, or lack thereof, along similar lines, through an impact between the body and its 
parts, on the one hand, and what lies outside, on the other [see Anaxagoras and Diogenes, DK 59 A 
92 (= 17.22); DK 64 A 19 (= 20.14) and (= 20.15)]; but we can see commensurability also in De-
mocritus’ consideration of the living being as a small world [DK 68 B34 (= 21.08)]. Such a view of 
the living being by analogy with the cosmos is legitimated by the fact that the coming-into-being of 
living creatures is part of the wider process of the becoming of the world and subjected to the same, 
or at least compatible, physical laws. 
31 On the influence of Alcmaeon’s physiological interests on later philosophical thought, see 
Longrigg 1993, 62. As for Parmenides, doxographic accounts (besides some fragments) present his 
ideas on living beings and the cosmos in alignment with those of the later Pluralists. Only recently, 
however, scholarship has started to take Parmenides’ engagement with natural philosophy seriously. 
This fact obliges us to consider that the theories of later Pluralists did not (merely) respond to his 
theory of being (see Guthrie 1965, vol. 2), but that they also continued his discourse on nature. Par-
menides’ logos on nature is currently the object of a systematic study by Rossetti (in press); earlier 
studies include Cerri 1999, Bollack 2006, 195-328, Rossetti 2015 (193-216), and Mansfield 2015 
[online]). If we follow Theophrastus on Parmenides and compare, at the same time, the doxographic 
evidence about specific theories (on the position of the earth, the origin of living beings, sexual re-
production, and perception), it is legitimate to trace an intellectual trajectory that begins with Anax-
imander and proceeds through Parmenides to Empedocles. In relation to the study of nature the dox-
ography presents Empedocles as a follower of Parmenides (D.L. 8.56), while, in a passage from Su-
da, Parmenides features either as a follower of Xenophanes (who in turn is claimed to have followed 
Anaximander) or, on the basis of the authority of Theophrastus, as a follower of Anaximander (Sud. 
4.59.11-5). In this respect, it is noteworthy that peri Physeōs (On Nature) is the title attributed not 
only to the book of Anaximander, but also to the poems of Parmenides and Empedocles (D.L. 8.56), 
and also noteworthy that the association between the origin of life and its perpetuation via a study of 
sexual reproduction first appears in the extant evidence in the thought of Parmenides. It is possible, 
however, that Anaximander had already dealt with it (see p. 15, n. 26 above and p. 51, n. 38). On the 
points of contact between Parmenides, on the one hand, and Anaxagoras and Empedocles, on the 
other, in respect to physical principles see Palmer (2009, 225-317), who surprisingly ignores the 
theories about living beings and their reproduction. For an attempt to reconstruct the legacy of Par-
menides’ doxa on Empedocles and connect it to Xenophanes, see Finkelberg 1997, 1-16.  
32 See chapter 2. 
33 Apart from Diogenes, for whom we do not have extant evidence, all these students of nature 
shared the same belief on the origin of animal life. See p. 28, n. 11. 
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*** 
True, the extant testimonies and fragments reveal a reflection on how hu-
mans became human by a process of natural acculturation, involving for in-
stance a change of diet, the discovery of fire and the tekhnai, and the creation of 
the social organization and the polis.34 Likewise, they reveal a preoccupation 
with the acquisition of knowledge and the mastery of truth, which pertain only 
to humans, the only living beings that are endowed with speech and as such are 
capable of giving a rational account (logos).35 But again this seemingly human 
centrality appears to dissolve into a beyond-human perspective if we regard the 
way humans became human and if we reflect on the nature of knowledge, which 
Xenophanes and Heraclitus problematized and which Parmenides further “radi-
calized.” The path humans took toward their “civilization” was made possible 
by the specific conformation of their bodies or by experience, not, importantly, 
by the intervention of the gods,36 genetic differentiation37 and/or by a different 
psychological make up. For Anaxagoras, among living beings, only humans 
happened to have hands,38 so they were able to interact with their habitat in 
ways that other animals could not and that determined their specific “cultural 
growth.” In this case, the difference, then, was one of body structure. It did not 
involve the exclusive possession of discrete perceptual and cognitive “potenti-
alities.”39 For Democritus, on the other hand, it was experiences and vicissitudes 
that taught men to do what they do.40 Overall, differences in intelligence or per-
ception were considered in terms of degrees and in line with an inquisitive poli-
tics that was based on inclusion rather than exclusion. In fact, from the extant 
evidence it appears that a clear rupture between humans and the other creatures 
came only with Alcmaeon and would remain a rather isolated fact in the history 
of Presocratic thought. According to Theophrastus, Alcmaeon was the first to 
distinguish the capacity to think from the capacity to perceive.41 These issues 
-------------------------------------------- 
34 In this respect, the evidence pertains to Anaxagoras [DK 59 B 4a (= 17.03)], Archelaus [DK 60 
A 4 (= 18.03)], and Democritus [DK 68 B 5/Diod. Sic. 1.8.8 (= 21.10), where, admittedly, we do not 
find the mention of the polis, but of the koinos bios (life in common)]; cf. Kahn, 1981, 92-108; Cole, 
1990, 5 and, more recently, Betegh, who argues for a more prominent role of Archelaus on issues of 
Kulturentstehunglehre (2017, 1-40). 
35 On the Presocratics’ interest in knowledge, see Lesher 1994, 11-34; 1999, 225-49, 2008, 458-
84.  
36 In this respect, the model of the emergence of humans by a natural process, endorsed by the 
Presocratics, is fundamentally different from the model of creation proposed by Hesiod, where Zeus 
and the immortal gods are said to have produced the metal races of men (Hes. Op. 110-173). 
37 Blundell, 1986, 86. 
38 DK 59 A 102 (= 17.31). 
39 For the Presocratics sensation and thought depended on physical interactions involving the 
body of the living being, on the one side, and other natural bodies, on the other. In the right condi-
tions and environments all living beings could have access to the same phenomenological experi-
ences (see chapter 3 and conclusion).  
40 DK 68 B 5/ Diod. Sic. 1.8.7 (= 21.10) and DK vol. II, Nachtrag, p. 423, I.17ff/Luria 558 (= 
21.14) 
41 Thph. de Sens. 25/DK 24 B 1a (= 08.09). 
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will be addressed in more detail later; here let it suffice to mention that for De-
mocritus human beings learned some of their technical skills from the other 
animals,42 a detail that again shows a displacement of man from a hypothetical 
center and that ties human “cultural growth” to that of other living beings. Non-
human animals had their natural tekhnai and living habits, which were consid-
ered continuous with those of humans.  
As for the nature of knowledge, Xenophanes turned it into a totally human 
affair, unrelated to animals. The path to knowledge was hard, but eventually 
successful.43 Heraclitus, on the other hand, criticized the conceited wisdom of 
Pythagoras, besides his polymathia, the knowledge of many things, which he 
also detected in the thought and work of other Presocratics, namely Hesiod, 
Xenophanes and Hecataeus. Both Heraclitus and Xenophanes, however, con-
ceived of human knowledge as encompassing all that derives from one or more 
original principles,44 thereby seeing connections and relations in a world where 
there could be only disconnected plurality or a “one-species’ (the human) cen-
trality.”45 In other words, the epistemological interest of these Presocratics took 
the shape of a reflection that, in the footsteps of the Milesians, broke through the 
human-centered perspective of the poets, or at least potentially had that effect.  
So Xenophanes’ manifesto of rational theology that if cows, horses or lions had 
hands they would represent their gods like themselves46 is striking not only on 
account of its provocation against traditional religion, but also because, however 
ironic it may be, it relativizes human perspective and aesthetics by appropriating 
other animal species with the possibility of having distinctive, legitimate, and 
equivalent points of view. Along the same lines, it is significant that at the out-
set of his enigmatic treatise Heraclitus claims to be giving an account (logos) of 
how everything came into being;47 likewise, he argues that most humans not 
only are unaware of his account but also would not understand it, because, as we 
read soon afterwards, humans understand all things in their own particular way. 
More literally, they have an understanding of their own (idia phronēsis), while 
Heraclitus qualifies his account as common (xynos).48 It is difficult to grasp the 
full significance of this adjective, which Sextus Empiricus further stresses (and 
-------------------------------------------- 
42 DK 68 B 154 (= 21.15).  
43 See DK 21 B 18 (= 06.06) [but there is more skepticism in DK 21 B 34 (= 06.07)]. 
44 For Xenophanes, see DK 21 B 27 (= 06.01, in relation to all things), and DK 21 B 29, DK 21 B 
33 (= 06.02, 06.03, respectively, in relation to things that come into being and grow, and human 
beings as members of the living world); as for Heraclitus, who stresses the common origin of all 
things from fire along with the regularity and predictability of change, see, for instance, DK 22 B 30 
(= 07.09) and DK 22 B 90 (= 07.11). For a recent assessment of Xenophanes’ cosmology and the 
position of earth and water within it, see Mourelatos 2009, 138-9 and 156-8. 
45 Given this common perspective, it is puzzling that Heraclitus criticized Xenophanes for poly-
mathia. This critique may depend on the fact that Xenophanes was a versatile poet who wrote on a 
number of topics, besides nature in the manner of the physikoi. 
46 DK 21 B 15 (= 06.04). 
47 DK 22 B 1 (= 07.04). 
48 DK 22 B 2 (= 07.05). 
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clarifies) through the addition of the more frequent equivalent koinos.49 But I 
believe in this contrast between, on the one hand, the particular (and therefore 
one-sided) understanding of the many and, on the other, the common (koinos) 
account of Heraclitus, we see an idiosyncratic facet of the beyond-the-human 
perspective that characterizes the Presocratic theories about life and the cosmos 
we have discussed so far.50 And while in the case of Xenophanes this approach 
emerges in an assessment of the traditional view of the gods, for Heraclitus it 
systematically takes shape in the wider framework of the doctrine of the oppo-
sites and its inherent relativity. True, Heraclitus’ common logos is a general 
structure that ultimately transcends all living beings (and not only humans). But 
it is significant that Heraclitus applies it to the variations in pleasure, habits, and 
life sustainability among different animals, humans included, appropriating each 
with its own individual perspective and therefore “equalizing” them. So, when 
applied to the context of living beings, the beyond-the-human approach led 
Heraclitus to observe that pigs wash in mud and farmyard birds in dust or 
ashes,51 in an implicit, mutual, and additional contrast, we may assume, to hu-
mans, who wash in water. He also defined the sea by means of his doctrine of 
opposites, which he illustrated through the contrary effects of seawater on fish 
and on men.52 
As for Parmenides, in his poem On Nature, he distinguishes between two 
types of “knowledge”:53 one comes from the goddess, and the other pertains to 
the limited horizons of mortals (brōtoi). Only the first holds a grasp of truth 
(alētheia). The second deals with what appears and consists in doxai (opin-
-------------------------------------------- 
49 Lesher, for instance, interprets koinos as suggesting the “real nature” or “deep structure” of the 
things themselves, but misses considering it in relation to the idia phronēsis, mentioned right above 
(1999, 232). 
50 The contrast between “common account” and “private understanding” should be related to that 
between waking and sleeping that frames Heraclitus’ epistemological and, in essence, ethical pre-
scriptions [see DK 22 B 1 (= 07.04) and DK 22 B 73 (= 07.06)]. Ultimately, Heraclitus’ account 
expounds a common world (namely a world ruled by the principle of Logos), which human beings 
fail to see because they live as if they were asleep. In this respect, see DK 22 B 89 (= 07.07): “Hera-
clitus says that those who are awake have a world that is one and common (koinos kosmos), but that 
each of those who are asleep turns inside into his own particular (idios) world.” On sleep and wake-
fulness in connection with the principles governing the world, see Guthrie 1962, 427-8. Cf. also DK 
22 B 114 (= 07.08), where Heraclitus speaks of what is common for all (xynon). 
51 DK 22 B 37 (= 07.25). 
52 See DK 22 B 61 (= 07.26) “The sea, the purest water and the foulest: for fish it is drinkable and 
life-giving; but for humans, undrinkable and deadly”. Other examples of animal perspectives include 
DK 22 B 9 (= 07.23) and DK 22 B 13 (= 07.24). For a compilation and discussion of Heraclitus’ 
fragments that relate to animals, see Viano 1997, 181-206. 
53 Cf. DK 28 B 6 (= 09.02) and DK 28 A 34 (= 09.05). I use the notion of knowledge here on the 
basis of the goddess’s address to Parmenides in which she announces him “you will know the nature 
of aither . . . and you will know the migratory deeds of the round-faced moon” [eisēi, eidēsesthai, 
respectively DK 28 B 10, lines 1 and 5 (= 09.08)]. With this rendition I endorse Coxon’s first edition 
(1986).   
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ions):54 it is the knowledge of nature. Still the goddess consigns to Parmenides 
an authoritative version with which Parmenides might be able to judge compet-
ing doxai.55 Following, like Anaximander and other Presocratics, a trajectory 
that joins the formation of the world with that of living beings, the goddess 
promises Parmenides the knowledge of how the things on high came into being: 
the sun, the moon, the sky, and the stars with their wanderings and positions.56 
Indeed, from Simplicius we learn that Parmenides started his account with the 
origin of the earth and the celestial bodies57 and that he eventually discussed 
how the goddess began “the painful birth and begetting of all” and the mutual 
attraction of male and female, which allowed the perpetuation of life for all liv-
ing beings.58 Here, once again, at the beginning of Parmenides’ logos on nature 
there is no accent on humans, which are included in the wider group of living 
beings that come into existence via sexual generation.59 Significantly, in com-
menting on the grand objects of Parmenides’ account (the earth, the sun, etc.), 
Simplicius adds the detail that Parmenides’ discussion of perceptible things 
(peri tōn aisthētōn) bequeathed (paradidonai) a discourse that moved from “the 
generation of the things that come into being and that perish until the parts of 
animals [moria tōn zōon].”60 Thus it seems that for Parmenides too, as for 
Xenophanes and Heraclitus, human knowledge stretches out to embrace the ori-
gin of the world and its creatures, tying the perceptible plurality to a primeval 
-------------------------------------------- 
54 DK 28 B 1, lines 28-30 (= 09.01). The contrast between the two forms of knowledge (alētheia 
and doxai) seems to lie in a prior contrast between the intelligible (noēton) and the perceptible (ais-
thēton), accounted for by conventional language. So, at least, the goddess indicates when she invites 
Parmenides not to give in to the “habit born of much experience” but to judge by reason (logos) [see 
DK 28 B 7 (= 09.03), and Guthrie 1965, 2: 25-6; but also Mansfeld 1999, 332, who however denies 
that Parmenides here may be referring to the phenomenon of perception because he rightly sees in 
glōssa a reference to language and not to the tongue as an organ of sense]. Yet, as Cerri argues, for 
Parmenides the doxai contain “a certain epistemological consistency” about the phenomena of the 
world (1999, 184, cf. 242-3). For a synopsis of different approaches to solve the apparent contradic-
tion between the two logoi in Parmenides’s poem, and the apparent clash between truth of the first 
and deceitfulness of the second, see Long 1963, 90-107. The question on these issues remains in fact 
open (see Mansfeld 2015 [online], and the bibliography there cited).  
55 The names the goddess bestows on phenomena are accurate. The emphasis in Parmenides’ po-
em on the names (onomata) with which humans describe the phenomena of nature and their con-
trasted arrangement (the list includes “coming into being and passing away, being and not being, 
change of place and alteration of bright color” [DK 28 B 8, lines 38-41 (= 09.04)]) shows an implicit 
critique to the use of language in forming opinions (doxai). It also further indicates that the authority 
of a doctrine lies in an accurate choice of words and its inherent effort for definitions.  
56 DK 28 B 10 (= 09.08). Only a few lines are preserved of Parmenides’ logos on nature, for a re-
construction of which we need to revert to the doxography (see p. 17, n. 31 above). 
57 Simp. In Cael. p. 559.20-25/DK 28 B 11 (= 09.09).  
58 See DK 28 B 12, lines 4-7 (= 09.10).  
59 Human generation comes under focus later with DK 28 B 17 (= 09.18) reported by Galen. 
60 See Simplicius on Cael. p. 559.26-27/DK 28 B 11 (= 09.09). In summarizing the content of 
Parmenides’ logos on nature, Plutarch, however, restricts the philosopher’s treatment to human gen-
eration (Adv. Col. 13 1114B, not listed in “Sources”), but this is in open contradiction with the gen-
eral context of fr. 12 (= 09.10), where we find the use of the epic adjective for male (arsēn) and fe-
male (thēly) to indicate sexual difference without species qualification, but with the expression pan-
ta (for everything); on this difficult diction, see Coxon 2009, 372. 
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source of everything in existence61—sun and moon, earth and sky, and every 
being that comes to life through the union of male and female, animals’ body 
parts included. And in this world full of light and night no living being (ouden 
zōon) is without reason,62 which dawns on it (filling the gap in the extant evi-
dence and anticipating the foregoing discussion) from a shared physical consti-
tution and the coincidence (or, at least, continuity) of perceiving and thinking. 
 
*** 
 
This book differs from the studies discussed above in that it starts from a 
different platform and aims to trace a specific intellectual trajectory that origi-
nated and developed with the Presocratics, and eventually reached Aristotle.63 
Before I undertake this task, some methodological remarks are required. Every 
work of reconstruction necessarily involves a dose of subjectivity and imagina-
tive, at times even daring, interpretation, and all the more so in a situation 
where, as here, we are left with fragments and testimonies that randomly survive 
the oblivion of the past.64 One could ask, for instance, how different our account 
would be if other fragments, and by other hands, had survived. Would we hold 
the same view, emphasize the same points? And, further, would we have the 
same focus and trace the same trajectory? Obviously, the evidence itself and the 
way it has been transmitted create some limits, and under circumstances like 
these any account must be somewhat partial, conditioned, on the one hand, by 
the incompleteness and randomness of the sources and, on the other, by the an-
gle of a given exegesis. Indeed, the very selection of a topic or question, which 
is part of the overall scope of an intellectual project, unbalances and somehow 
violates the interpretation of the text in question, bending it to our inquisitive 
interests. This happened in the studies reviewed above through their focus on 
the human, and there is the risk that it may also affect the present study. One has 
to be careful.  
The trajectory followed in this analysis of the Presocratics is one suggested 
by Aristotle in Parts of Animals, where he chooses to bypass differences among 
the early philosophers and instead pinpoints the common denominator of their 
inquiry into nature: the identification of a material origin and the ensuing devel-
-------------------------------------------- 
61 For the doxography, everything for Parmenides comes into being from fire and earth [DK 28 A 
24 (= 09.06) and DK 28 A 7 (= 09.07)]. 
62 DK 28 A 45 (= 09.22); there is an interesting overlapping with Empedocles who said that “all 
have thought (phronēsis) and a share of understanding (aisa noēmatos)” [DK 31 B 110 (= 10.51)].  
In commenting on this line Sextus includes in the “all,” not only animals (zōa) but also plants 
(phyta) [Sext. Adv. Math. 8.286/DK 31 B 110 (= 10.60)]. 
63 This book originated from the necessity to understand the Presocratics’ positions on animals to 
which Aristotle responded in his study of living beings and life. I undertake a study of Aristotle in a 
parallel book-length manuscript titled The Logos of Life Itself: Aristotle and the Animals. 
64 See, for instance, Osborne (1987, 1-13), who challenges the validity of the traditional approach 
to the Presocratics because it extrapolates fragments and testimonies from their embedded texts 
without any consideration for the context of the quotation.   
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opment of the cosmos, down to the formation of animals and plants. Now, Aris-
totle may well have had his own bias in this homogeneous reception of the 
Presocratics.65 For instance, he adopts his doctrine of the causes to comprehend 
their project,66 and ends his interpretive trajectory with the formation of plants 
and animals, which in fact constitutes the focus of his own inquiry in the bio-
logical treatises.67 Their projects included topics that he leaves out. For instance, 
Aristotle omits the religious, eschatological implications of Empedocles’ study 
of nature or Democritus’ considerations of how animals’ bodies related to their 
lives in terms of food provisions and interspecies relations. He also omits to 
mention the technical, social and political growth of humans with which (some 
of) the Presocratics engaged, although we may well trace a permanence of their 
thought in this respect in Aristotle’s notorious definition of man as a political 
animal (politikon zōon) and in his notion of the naturalness of the polis.68  This 
last point, along with the treatment of desire in the ethics, shows Aristotle’s sys-
tematization of the topics dealt by the Presocratics under the umbrella of physis 
into a regimented set of related disciplines. Further, Aristotle also neglects the 
so-called Monists to focus on the so-called Pluralists,69 most likely because he 
was a Pluralist himself.70 But in delineating among the Presocratics this common 
path—from the basic stuff to the diverse forms of life that belong to the whole, 
as he calls it—Aristotle still offers us a legitimate view whose implications are 
relevant for our understanding of his predecessors’ thought about animals and 
their lives, humans and plants included, and certainly one that shaped Aristotle’s 
own discussion. Indeed, by following Aristotle’s remarks, this study succeeds in 
-------------------------------------------- 
65 Since Cherniss (1935), who offered a negative assessment of Aristotle’s account of the 
Presocratics, scholarship has been divided between skepticism (Kingsley 1995, 384-9; Most 1999, 
323-33; Laks 2006, 55-56) and more neutral evaluations of Aristotle’s history of earlier philosophy 
(Collobert 2002, 281-95, Frede 2004, 99-44, Leszl 2006, 550-80).  Here I align with Baltussen 
(2000, 28-9) and take Aristotle’s historical overview in terms of reception and as the theoretical ba-
sis against which he constructs his discourse on animals. Leszl (2006, 370) remarks that the label 
physikoi for the Presocratics was not contemporary to them, but belonged to the Peripatetic classifi-
cation (cf. Wright 1981, 85-6).  
66 In this respect, see Lennox (2001, 131 and 126), who points out that the appeal to the notion of 
phenomena and causes is distinctively Aristotelian. Cf. Inwood 2001, 29 for the biased reading of 
Empedocles.  
67 In fact, arguably in opposition to the Presocratics, Aristotle strives to distinguish plants from 
animals and in order to assess an ontological difference between them, he intersperses observations 
on plants in his treatises on animals (see p. 70, n. 1). Yet he devotes to plants a separate study, which 
has not come down to us. Mentions of this treatise can be found in History of Animals (5.539a21) 
and Generations of Animals (1.716a1 and 731a 29-30). 
68 Aristot. Pol. 1.1252a24-1253a40. 
69 See Physics 1.184b15-23, where in discussing the principles (arkhai) of nature—that is “the ul-
timate constituents of existing things”—Aristotle distinguishes among his predecessors between 
those that posed the principles into one and those that posed them into many, and as examples of the 
choices of the first he mentions air and water.  
70 See Parts of Animals 2.646a14-24, where he discusses the three-layered structure that gives 
rise to a given living being and encompasses in turn a composition of elements, body parts and the 
living body itself.  
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giving a cohesive and consistent reading of the extant sources— despite their 
fragmentary status, erratic transmission and intrinsic differences—and even 
provides new angles of consideration and details. Besides, this discussion of the 
evidence will also eventually shed light on the development of Aristotle’s own 
position with regard to the study of animals. For, while Aristotle inherited from 
Plato the appreciation of reason as the hallmark of man, he considered animals, 
humans included, in terms of their bodies and capacity to live, thereby voicing a 
position that made him closer to the early Greek philosophers, students of na-
ture.71 
 
*** 
 
 This book is composed of six chapters. They are thematically conceived so 
as to break the Presocratics’ discourse on animals down into complementary 
facets that illuminate the relation of living beings to the cosmos and to one an-
other and that reveal a profound integrated vision, based on an interconnected-
ness stemming from living beings’ original interrelatedness and manifesting it-
self at multiple levels (from constitutional and sensorial to environmental72 and 
even, as it were, “cosmic”).73 Chapter 1 delineates a common trajectory in the 
Presocratics’ inquiry of nature. It shows how animals (zōa), humans included, 
were the products of the same phenomena that gave rise to the cosmos and how 
animals themselves helped establish it via the emergence of distinct habitats. In 
discussing the constitution of animal bodies, it underscores the Presocratics’ at-
tention to bodily shapes and functions, highlighting the philosophical role that 
analogies played in the accounts of living beings. Chapter 2 continues the dis-
cussion of animal formation, pinpointing in chance (tykhē, as implicitly opposed 
to tekhnē) the overarching factor determining the Presocratics’ view on the con-
stitution of living beings, both at the time of their origin and thereafter. It pur-
sues the consequences of such a view for an understanding of animals’ differen-
tiation into multiple forms of life and argues for an overall human/animal conti-
-------------------------------------------- 
71 In Parts of Animals 1.641a18-641b10 Aristotle asks whether it is pertinent to include a discus-
sion of the soul in the study of animals. He considers the nutritive, sensitive and locomotive parts 
important, but implicitly excludes the rational one as irrelevant to the physis (nature) of a living be-
ing. 
72 At an epiphenomenal level, so to speak, “interconnectedness” is manifested in the use of analo-
gies as tools that reveal an aesthetic and functional connection among living beings. At an ontologi-
cal level, interconnectedness is intrinsic to the fact that living beings possess the same mechanism of 
sensation and thought as well as the same soul, which in different doctrines appears to be the arkhē. 
The identification of the soul with the arkhē leads to another level of interconnection between the 
living being, on the one hand, and its immediate environment and the cosmos, on the other. Con-
ceived of in this way, interconnectedness will be relevant to the discussion of several chapters (1, 3, 
4, and 5; see below). 
73 By cosmic I am here referring to the fact that the living being was considered a microcosm. 
Such a consideration shows a connectedness between living beings and the world that is based on 
their sharing, on (respectively) a small and large scale, the same systemic organization (see chapter 
1). 
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nuity. Chance, however, does not exclude the rational: as this chapter shows, in 
their effort to explain the perpetuation of life, the Presocratics find a key to un-
derstanding sexual reproduction and, according to the testimonies, even manipu-
lating it. Chapter 3 moves on to Presocratic theories of how animals sensed, and 
interacted with, the world. It focuses on the physiological nature of sensation 
and thought as well as on their overlapping. Chapter 4 is dedicated to plants. On 
the basis of the extant evidence and by means of a circumstantial argument, it 
sheds light on the status of plants as animals (zōa) further pursuing the continu-
ity among all forms of life which characterizes the Presocratics’ inquiry into na-
ture. Part of this chapter was published in Arion in winter 2016 within an inter-
disciplinary study that shows the influence of Presocratic philosophy, and par-
ticularly Empedocles, on the conception of plant metamorphosis in Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses. Chapter 5 discusses Presocratic theories about the soul and 
complements chapter 3 on thought and sensation. This division of chapters al-
lows a reconstruction of the development of the notion of the soul from Homer 
to the early Greek philosophers. This chapter focuses on Heraclitus, Diogenes of 
Apollonia, and Democritus. It investigates the physiological role of the soul in 
relation to the arkhē of the cosmos (water, air, fire, etc.) and concludes by dis-
cussing Pythagoras’ theory of the soul’s immortality and transmigration, along 
with its consequences for an understanding of animal life. Chapter 6 analyzes 
the conception of animals in the cosmology of Plato’s Timaeus, which I take as 
a crucial response to the Presocratics’ position on living beings and life in the 
natural world and emblematic of the radical shift established by Plato. With the 
introduction of the tripartite soul—appetitive, spirited, rational—and concur-
rently, the assignment of its parts to discrete areas of the body, and the exclusion 
of nonhuman animals from the rational soul, Plato dramatically departs from the 
notion of a unity embracing all living beings, voiced by the Presocratics dis-
cussed in this book, and radically elevates man, body and soul, to the height of 
god. 
 Based on an extensive reading of the ancient evidence, this volume com-
prises a collection of all the sources that have been discussed or referred to in 
the course of the chapters. After a section titled “General Remarks,” this collec-
tion presents the authors in chronological order and organizes the evidence per-
taining to each author thematically. Structured in this way, it accounts for the 
different, interrelated aspects that constituted the Presocratics’ reflection on liv-
ing beings and life within their cosmological perspective and extends to encom-
pass the radical rupture between man and the other species (including the “fe-
male”) established by Plato’s Timaeus. 
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Chapter 1 
A Presocratic Trajectory: From the Origin of the 
World to Animals and Plants 
Before Aristotle, the study of animals belonged to the history of the cosmos, 
which the Presocratics traced from its beginning to the present as they con-
ducted a large-scale inquiry into nature (physis).1 As Naddaf has argued, for the 
Presocratics physis was a polyvalent notion that covered all stages in the devel-
opment of the universe, from its absolute beginning (arkhē) to its final result.2 
-------------------------------------------- 
1 Plat. Phaed. 96a8 (peri physeōs hystoria); X. Mem. 1.1.14; cf. Leszl 2006, 366-9. Aristotle calls 
his predecessors who engaged in the study of nature physiologoi (e.g., Met. 1.990a3; PA 1.640a7), 
physikoi (e.g., Phys. 1.184b17), and hoi philosophēsantes peri physeōs [e.g., PA 1.640b5-6 (= 0.1)]. 
On Peri physeōs as the title that the tradition has assigned to the works of a number of Presocratics 
(Anaximander, Anaximenes, Alcmaeon, Xenophanes, Zenon, Melissus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, 
Diogenes of Apollonia, Philolaus, and Gorgias), and on its authenticity and the topics discussed in 
such “treatises,” see Rossetti 2010 (vol. II.815-18) and Laks, 2006, 10; for a view that stresses, in-
stead, the progressive formation of the notion of physis as a collective noun encompassing all things 
that make up the world, see Macé 2012, 47-84 (cf. Patzer 1993) and introduction, p. 12, n. 15. 
2 Naddaf 2005, 64. Laks identifies two fundamental features of the Presocratics’ inquiry into na-
ture: the reflection on the origins and its all-encompassing scale. But he also claims that the label of 
physiologoi does not exhaust their identity and the scope of their inquisitive interest (2006, 7-21). 
There is a question as to how far the Presocratics’ cosmogonies extended, whether, for instance they 
included material culture, the creation of cities and political organizations as developments of physis 
(in which case the label of physiologoi is still accurate). Naddaf thinks that the Presocratics’ cos-
mogonies branched into a “politogony” (2005; on this position, see Mansfeld, 1997, 754-8), but the 
first sound evidence testifying to an inclusion of human society and material culture in Presocratic 
thought pertains, in fact, to Archelaus and Democritus. Further, Kahn emphasizes that Anaxagoras, 
Archelaus’ teacher, also dealt with the development of human society, a feature that denies Arche-
laus’ originality and may in fact be traced back to Anaximander, although, as the author continues, 
no sound basis can be provided [see DK 59 B 4a (= 17.03), Kahn 1981, 103]. For a critique of Nad-
daf and Kahn, see Betegh (2016, 8-10), who stresses that in Anaxagoras the focus is on cosmic 
forces and not on the reasons for human agency (as it will be in Archelaus), holding that before Ar-
chelaus cosmogonies ended in “zoogony and anthropogony.” Yet I believe it is still possible to sup-
pose that some Presocratics (certainly, at least, Anaxagoras) included in their cosmogony a consid-
eration of the development of human society and politics, basing it on the “human animal” itself and 
not merely cosmic forces. I pointed out earlier (see introduction, p. 18) that for Anaxagoras the 
higher degree of human intelligence in respect to the other animals had to do with the structure of 
the human body and the possession of hands [DK 59 A 102 (= 17.31)]. Armed with these tools (the 
hands), humans were able to develop crafts, build cities and live in political organizations as de-
scribed in DK 59 B 4a (= 17.03). Further, Diogenes too may have discussed these issues inasmuch 
as he acknowledges a multiform differentiation among animals not only with respect to their bodily 
appearance and intelligence, but also with respect to their way of living [diaita, DK 54 B 5 (= 
20.05)]. When applied to the differences specific to the human animal, the notion of diaita may 
likely encompass dwelling, diet, and social and political organizations. 
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Before Aristotle there was no work dealing specifically with animals other than 
perhaps Democritus’ Causes Concerned with Animals.3 Aristotle’s predeces-
sors—even Plato, with the philosophical myth in Timaeus— shared a common 
interest in exploring the process that brought animals into existence as a step 
within the history of the universe. This at least, is how Aristotle interprets the 
previous inquiry on animals as he discusses its context in Parts of Animals:  
Now the ancients who first began philosophizing about nature were examining the 
material origin and that sort of cause: what matter is and what sort of thing it is, and 
how the whole (to holon) comes to be from it and what moves it (e.g. whether strife, 
love, mind, or spontaneity). They also examined what sort of nature the underlying 
matter has of necessity, e.g. whether the nature of fire is hot, of earth cold, and 
whether the nature of fire is light, of earth heavy. In fact, even the cosmos they gen-
erate in this way. And they speak in a like manner too of the generation of animals 
and plants […].4  
For the early philosophers of nature, the study of animals revolved around 
the understanding of their origin, which was traced back to the primordial sub-
stance and the process it underwent. Crucial for jump-starting this process was a 
“motive origin,” variously identified as love and strife, mind, or spontaneity, 
and in each particular system of thought it was the interaction between the “mo-
tive origin” and the primordial substance—the “material origin”—that gave rise 
in successive steps to the present organized universe.5 Plants, animals, and hu-
mans were the protagonists of this history,6 deriving from variations of the same 
basic physical mechanism yet adding further layers of completion.  
In fact, in the Parts of Animals passage cited above Aristotle performs a 
preliminary screening of previous doctrines and delineates a field of reference 
that seems restricted to the pluralists among his predecessors. For with the men-
tion of strife (neikos) and love (philia), mind (nous), and spontaneity (automa-
ton) as “motive origins” Aristotle has a clear set of Presocratics in mind: Empe-
docles, Anaxagoras, and perhaps Democritus.7 And it is noteworthy that these 
-------------------------------------------- 
3 Leszl 2007, 33; on Democritus’ dissection of animals, see Hp. Pseud. Ep. 17 (not listed in the 
“Sources” section); for a recent assessment of Democritus’ contribution to zoology in the context of 
medical and traditional knowledge, see Perilli 2007, 143-79. 
4 Arist. PA 1.640b5-13 (= 0.1). (trans. by J.G. Lennox, with slight modifications) 
5 Cf. Lennox (2001, 136), from whom I adopt the expressions “material origin” and “motive ori-
gin.” On the place of cosmology in early Greek philosophy, see Long 1999, 5. 
6 Naddaf  2005, 28-35. 
7 Balme 1992, 87. Lennox (2001, 136) questions the reference to Democritus in Parts of Animals 
on the basis that neither later in Parts of Animals (1.641b15-23) nor in Physics (Phys. 2.196a25-
196b5) does Aristotle mention Democritus when discussing spontaneity (automaton). In fact, this 
could still be another allusion to Empedocles if we consider Physics 2.198b27, where Aristotle 
brings up chance (automaton) as the factor responsible, in Empedocles’ zoogony, for the successful 
constitution of the creatures that were able to survive, in contrast to the less fortunate ones, which 
were unsuitable to life and perished. See below p. 33. In addition to the philosophers referred to in 
the above passage from Parts of Animals, On Generation and Corruption reveals that Aristotle also 
studied Parmenides, who in positing earth and fire as the “material origin” can also be considered a 
“pluralist” (GC 2.330b13-7). And, indeed, although too scanty to receive a proper treatment in this 
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Presocratic philosophers were also those who included in their project a study of 
plants.8 For them, whether the substantial matter consisted of the four elements, 
of homeomeries, or of atoms, all living creatures derived from an aggregation of 
the basic units that composed the primordial substance.9 It is true that we are 
better informed for Empedocles than for Anaxagoras and Democritus, but the 
sparse and distinct testimonies we have for the pluralists still help depict a 
common scenario for the rise of living beings in the history of the cosmos. On 
the other hand, we may well assume that in conceiving only one principle 
(arkhē) for the cosmos the monists too (Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes and 
later Diogenes of Apollonia) considered all living beings as deriving from the 
same original constituent, this time by a process of qualitative change rather 
than aggregation. At least this is what Aristotle let us understand in Physics 1 
where he divides the earlier students of nature into two categories on the basis 
of whether they placed the arkhē in a single “ingredient” or more.10 
All creatures shared a common origin and emerged from the earth, or earth 
and moisture;11 humans were lumped in with the other animals, as the relatively 
widespread use of the expression “humans and the other animals” (hoi anthrō-
poi kai ta alla zōa) seems to indicate.12 Whether their rise was synchronous with 
-------------------------------------------- 
chapter and obscured by his doctrine of being, Parmenides’ fragments and testimonies reveal a line 
of inquiry that addressed the emergence of life within a cosmological perspective, and that discussed 
the same issues as the “later” pluralists did, such as the birth of animals from the earth and the indi-
viduation of habitable zones to embryology, and the coincidence of life with reason—to mention a 
few. 
8 Plants may have been included in Anaximander’s cosmology too inasmuch as he uses the image 
of “bark” (phloios) around a tree (dendron) to account for the origin of the world [DK 12 A 10 (= 
03.01)] as well as that of living beings [DK 12 A 30 (= 03.03)]. Further, if we follow the trend in 
Presocratic thought (see chapter 4) of considering plants living beings (zōa), it is legitimate to as-
sume that plants may have featured also in Parmenides who is reported to have said that no living 
being is deprived of logos [DK 28 A 45 (= 09.22), see introduction p. 22].  
9 Cf. Physics (2.193a21-8), where Aristotle traces a first distinction in his predecessors’ concep-
tion of the primary substance. Some placed it in one substance, others in multiple substances, but 
either way they considered it eternal, while everything else that derived from the primary substance 
“passed into existence and out of it eternally.” 
10 See n. above. 
11 Guthrie 1965, 2: 210, 315 n. 2, and 472 n. 2 [according to the doxography, the idea that life 
originated from moistened earth was already in Anaximander, DK 12 A 11 (= 03.02) and DK 12 A 
30 (= 03.03, 03.04; cf. 03.05); see introduction pp. 15-7; for Xenophanes, see DK 21 B33 and DK 
21 B 29 (= 06.02, 06.03); for Archelaus, a contemporary of Anaxagoras, see DK 60 A 1 (= 18.01); 
for Democritus, see DK 68 B 5 (= 21.10) and DK 68 B 5.2 (= 21.11); cf. Guthrie 1957, 31-42; Kahn 
1960, 109-113]. Empedocles presents a more complex situation: he envisions, if we follow Aëtius, 
four different zoogonies [DK 31 A 72/Aët. 5.19.5 (= 10.12)]. Of them only the third springs directly 
from the earth [DK 31 B 62 (= 10.19)], that of the whole-natured beings (holophyeis) while we can 
assume that the other three derive from the “running together” of the elements under the influence of 
Love and Strife. Yet earth still plays a fundamental role as one of the components of living beings, 
especially so in the formation of the terrestrial animals, inasmuch as they are geoidē.  
12 See, for instance, Anaxagoras [DK 59 B 4a (= 17.03)], Archelaus [DK 60 A 4 (= 18.02)], Dio-
genes [DK 64 B4 (= 20.04)]; cf. Anaximander DK 12 A 10, 11 (= 03.01, 03.02) and 30 (= 03.04, 
03.05) where humans are said to develop from another form of life. Further, Empedocles uses a 
similar notion when discussing “the running together” of the elements and the subsequent emer-
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that of the other animals or derived from an already established form of life, 
humans still belonged to the animal club. Significantly, because it was framed 
by a cosmological perspective, the inquiry of the Presocratics did not revolve 
around the question of what makes humans human.13 The base of their inquiry 
was large, and the focus rather unbiased, and the extant evidence suggests that 
they aimed to understand the source of life and its multiple forms in a system of 
integrated differences. For instance, there was little distinction between anthro-
pogony and zoogony. As Campbell remarks, zoogony was “simply a function of 
cosmogony, and anthropogony an aspect of zoogony.”14 Accordingly, no privi-
leged event set humans apart from the other living beings of the world, such as 
happened in the mythical accounts of Protagoras and Timaeus in Plato’s ho-
monymous treatises. These two accounts unleashed a discourse that aimed to 
establish human distinction and superiority: in Protagoras, humans emerged 
above the other animals as a distinct species by divine intervention and the theft 
of fire and the gift of politics;15 in Timaeus, they were the first species created 
by the gods, and animals then emerged as natural ‘mutations’ resulting from the 
embodiments of humans’ fallen souls.16 And even if, among the Presocratics, 
Empedocles did conceive a distinct zoogony producing just humans, that of the 
whole-natured beings,17 in this case too humans’ unique emergence vis-à-vis 
that of other animals should be considered in terms of the cycle of double gene-
sis and destruction (doiē genesis/apoleipsis) governing all mortal creatures 
(thnēta) rather than as a statement about human exclusivity.18 Overall, the 
Presocratics wove an inclusive discourse that accounted for a diversity among 
living beings based on bodily forms and “physiology”— and in turn habitats—
and tempered it by means of its inquisitive strategies: on the one hand, the sys-
tematic search for a common origin and the processes underlying the formation 
of all living beings, and on the other, the identification of formal and functional 
analogies connecting them all.19  
-------------------------------------------- 
gence of human and animal life [with the expression hoi anthropoi kai allōn ethnea thērōn, see DK 
31 B 26 (= 10.10)].  
13 The ancient Greeks’ efforts to explain what defines humans vis-à-vis the other animals, along 
with the shifting boundaries of that definition, have been in the spotlight of recent studies. See, for 
instance, Osborne 2007, 24-54, and Lloyd 2012, 8-30 (and introduction, pp. 11-2). Yet, in focusing 
on the definition of the human (Lloyd), and in pursuing the aprioristic subjectivity of the demarca-
tion between “us” and them (the animals) or the self-referentiality of a presumed continuity (Os-
borne), these studies support an anthropocentric approach, which the present project intends to 
downplay. 
14 Campbell 2000, 159. In this respect, it is significant that in his review of the Presocratics’ in-
quisitive project Aristotle mentions animals (zōa) and plants (phyta), but omits humans (anthrōpoi), 
thereby including them in the wider category of living beings (zōa) [PA 1.640b12-3 (= 0.1)]. 
15 Plat. Prot. 321e-322d; cf. Osborne 2007, 30-4. 
16 See the discussion of Plato’s Timaeus in chapter 6. 
17 For a discussion of this position, see below pp. 36-7. 
18 P. Strasb. vv. 232-35 ed. Primavesi 2008 (= DK 31 B 17.1-3) (= 10.05). 
19 In fact, their discourse not only diverged from Plato’s but also contrasted with that embedded 
in the practice of animal sacrifice, supported by the religion of the polis and revealing in ancient 
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Indeed, the delineation of a common scenario and the construction of an in-
clusive discourse stemmed in part from the careful attention given to the shape 
and color of animal bodies, to their discrete parts, and to the apparent aesthetic 
and structural unity connecting the different forms of life on this planet. And the 
identification of this formal connection was yet another manifestation, and 
proof, of the organized nature of the world. The Presocratics’ gaze then moved 
from the external constitution of animals to the internal, pausing on the organic 
tissues and tracing the process of animal reproduction. They explained in this 
way the transition from the beginning of life to its perpetuation. In the next stage 
of this inquiry they looked at the psychological and mental activities of all ani-
mal, human and plant life (ta zōa). For trees too were considered zōa, regarded 
as animals’ fellow creatures.  
At the same time, the emergence of animals in the plurality of all their dif-
ferent forms led to the differentiation of the environment itself, which was di-
vided in turn into distinct habitats suitable to each kind. It was only after the ap-
pearance of life that the earth tilted on its axis, as we will soon see in the context 
of Anaxagoras and Diogenes. As the growth of the cosmos was thus interlaced 
with the origin of animals in a nonlinear path, the appearance of birds, the ter-
restrial creatures, and fish was not just the last phenomenon to occur; rather, an-
imals’ act of existence and the place of their manifestation constituted in them-
selves defining elements of the universe. This is, in a nutshell, the trajectory of 
the Presocratic studies, which the next sections will discuss in depth on the basis 
of the extant fragments and testimonies. 
1.1.  Bodies in an Interconnected Living World  
Poet and doctor, mystic and philosopher, a charismatic citizen of the polis 
of Akragas, Empedocles represents a complex figure whose different facets can 
be related to a knowledge of nature that allowed him to understand, and ulti-
mately unmask, the phenomena of life and death.20 According to his doctrine, 
the world in all its aspects, living beings included, is composed of the four ele-
ments: earth, water, air and fire. Empedocles calls them roots (rhizōmata) so as 
to stress their originative power.21 “Of nothing there is growth (physis), among 
all mortal things (thnēta) nor is there an ending coming from baleful death 
(thanatos), but only mixture (mixis) and exchange (diallaxis) of things mixed 
-------------------------------------------- 
Greek thought the presence of a radical, unbridgeable difference between humans and animals. In 
the Greek communities, as Vernant argued a few decades ago, the performance of blood sacrifice at 
once brought humans closer to the gods while further removing them from the animals they felt enti-
tled to kill [Vernant 1980, 105-6 (first ed. 1972); cf. Vidal-Naquet 1975, 129-142]. 
20 In Empedocles’ thought mortality constitutes, I believe, the interface between the domains of 
physics and religion, which for so long scholarship has kept artificially divided, thereby splitting the 
philosopher’s work into two poems.   
21 DK 31 B 6 (= 10.04); see Montevecchi 2010, 59. 
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exist, and ‘birth’ is a name given by mortal humans.”22 The mixture of these 
four roots gives rise to the formation and growth of all living beings—man, wild 
beasts, bushes or birds23— while their interchange decrees what ordinary men 
call death.24 In several fragments, Empedocles refers to the totality of living be-
ings as mortal (thnēta)25 with the aim of reassessing, and revealing in physical 
terms, the phenomenon of their lives, conventionally defined by a beginning and 
an end. In fact, the birth and death of mortal creatures are not absolute inasmuch 
as the physical elements that compose them are eternal and reassemble in new 
compositions, thereby concurring to form new bodies, whether animal or not.  In 
this way, all living beings, from humans to bushes, are involved in a constant 
process of metensomatosis; Empedocles focuses on the material compositions of 
the bodies and their epiphenomenal quality rather than on the embodiment of a 
dianoetic principle like the soul.26 Indeed, for the philosopher of physis looking 
at the creatures of his world, all living beings share a common nature, regardless 
of their individuality and animal specificity, because they are composed from 
the same roots. They undergo the same basic biological phenomena while par-
ticipating in a physical reality that transcends them and ultimately tempers their 
empirical differences.  
The aggregation and disaggregation of the four roots under the influence of 
Love and Strife is also key to understanding the history of the cosmos along 
with the original emergence and ensuing development of life. Empedocles men-
tions a double birth (doiē genesis) and a double waning (doiē apoleipsis) of 
mortal things (thnēta) relating them to two distinct phases of the cosmos: one 
under the rule of Love, the other under that of Strife. Ultimately, we hear, the 
-------------------------------------------- 
22 DK 31 B 8 (= 10.02); see also DK 31 B 15 (= 10.01). 
23 DK 31 B 9 (= 10.03). The elemental source of the multiple forms of life, gods included, is men-
tioned also in the Strasbourg papyrus [vv. 269-272 ed. Primavesi 2008] [not in “Sources”, but the 
series of living beings it recounts is the same as in DK 31 B 21 (= 10.06)], while another set of lines 
(vv. 294-8 ed. Primavesi 2008) presents Empedocles’ exhortation to see “the coming together and 
the unfolding of generation” in the existing various forms of life, from wild beasts to flowers and 
grape vines (= 10.07). 
24 On the influence of Parmenides in Empedocles’ philosophy of nature and the presence of two 
ontologies, see Inwood 2001, 24-6. 
25 As Trépanier remarks in reference to line 3 of B 17 (= P. Strasb. v. 234) (= 10.05), thnēta (mor-
tal things) is an umbrella term that encompasses all mortal beings (2003, 23-5); see also Bignone 
1916, 551.   
26 For this point see Gallavotti 1975, XIII-XIV. It is true that Empedocles mentions the exiled 
daimones, who break away from the “blessed ones” and for ten thousand years “grow to be all sorts 
of forms of mortal things through time interchanging the hard paths of life” [DK 31 B 115 (= 
10.61)]. Yet this phenomenon, whose beginning signals the end of the daimonic cycle, has to be 
distinguished from the emergence and unfolding of life in the successive cosmic cycle and its phas-
es. In other words, the exiled daimons may well be “incarnate” in different forms of life and there-
fore hold an ontological specificity, regardless of their different embodiments, but their fate merely 
intersects the universal process of mixture and interchange in which the four roots of the world are 
involved. On daimons’ “individuality,” see Gain 2007, 146-7. Empedocles himself claims to belong 
to the daimons, as he remembers having been “a boy and a girl and a bush and a bird and a fish” 
[DK 31 B 117 (= 10.62)]; cf. Sedley 2007, 31-2, 50-1.  
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rule of Love becomes absolute, turning the cosmos into a Sphere that embraces 
all the four roots in a state of total union and rest, while relegating Strife to the 
margins. In turn, eventually, Strife takes over, leading the four roots to radical 
separation until Love begins again to exercise its unifying effect; and this alter-
nation of the two forces with their respective cosmic phases goes on ad infini-
tum. Meanwhile, between the stages of Love and Strife’s absolute dominions, 
decreeing respectively the total union and separation of the elements, mortal 
things are born and disappear, twice.27  
As to what type of mortal things the two zoogonies produce, Aëtius’ well-
known overview presents a succession of four discontinuous generations, whose 
specificity is confirmed by Empedocles’ extant fragments. Each generation of 
plants and animals betrays a consistent focus on creatures’ bodies, discussed in 
terms of constitution and appearance of parts (or their lack), and how ultimately 
complementary parts of the body ultimately join and grow together giving rise 
to self-sustainable beings.28 
Empedocles: the first generations of animals and plants were not at all born as com-
plete entities (holoklēroi), but were disconnected, with parts that had not grown to-
gether; the second ones, when the parts had grown together, had the appearance of 
phantasms (eidōlophaneis); the third ones were the generations of the whole-natured 
(holophyeis); the fourth ones no longer came from similar things, like earth and wa-
ter, but henceforth from each other, in some cases because of the thickening of their 
food, in others too because of the women’s beauty caused an excitation of the sper-
matic movement.29  
The first zoogony is defined negatively, in opposition to an organic model 
based on completeness and intergrowth.30 It consists, indeed, of bare parts 
sprung from the earth and wandering alone. “As many heads without neck 
sprouted up and arms wandered naked, bereft of shoulders, and eyes roamed 
-------------------------------------------- 
27 P. Strasb. vv. 232-257/LM EMP. D73 (= 10.05); cf. also DK 31 B 26 (= 10.10) and Trépanier’s 
discussion (2003, 22-8). In fact, fragment B 17 (= 10.05) has been at the center of a vexed, perennial 
question as to whether Empedocles envisioned one zoogony or two, one under Love and the other 
under Strife. This last view has been canonical for many decades (Bignone 1916, 545-85, Guthrie 
1969, 200-11) and was eventually challenged by a number of scholars who claimed, instead, only 
one continuous zoogony under the rule of Love (Hölscher 1965, 7-33; Bollack 1965, 95-124; Solm-
sen 1965, 109-48; Long 1974, 397-425; Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983, 299-305, and recently 
Santaniello 2004, 23-81). The discovery of the Strasbourg papyrus, with new fragments of Empedo-
cles has confirmed the two-zoogonies interpretation and has been supported recently by a number of 
scholars (Martin and Primavesi 1999, 54-7, 80-2, 95-7; Sedley 2007, 33-5, 40-1). For a comprehen-
sive survey of the bibliography on this question see Montevecchi 2010, 68, n. 76. 
28 In this respect, the myth in Plato’s Protagoras provides an interesting parallel to Empedocles’ 
zoogonies. For in distributing different and complementary parts, and features, to animals Epi-
metheus created different species, thereby playing the same role as chance in the Presocratic phi-
losophical accounts (Plat. Prot. 320c-328d). 
29 Aët.  5.19.5/DK 31 A 72 (= 10.12). For holophyeis, see note 6 in “Sources.” 
30 By using the adjective holoklēreis (entire) as to describe what the first zoogony is not, Empe-
docles reveals a notion of the organic body as divided into basic units that belong to more complex 
formal configurations. Thus, in DK 31 B 57 (= 10.13), cited below, he mentions heads without 
necks and eyes without foreheads. 
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alone, impoverished of foreheads,”31 writes Empedocles, turning distinct parts of 
the body into self-enclosed, original living beings. In the next stage these dis-
crete animal parts merge by chance to form hybrid, experimental bodies quite 
unlike the harmonious creatures of the present. Members of this zoogony in-
clude “oxen with a human head” (ta bougenē androprōira), living beings with 
oxen heads implanted on human bodies (androphyē boukrana), and cattle with 
countless hands; others have two faces and two breasts (amphiprosōpa kai am-
phisterna), and are composed of both female and male parts.32 Among these, ac-
cording to Aristotle, only those that are apt to live survive, while the rest perish33 
and the key to this survival is a fit combination of the parts forming animal bod-
ies.34 At any rate, whereas this zoogony is defined by surplus and mismatching, 
and excess of forms, the next one—that of the oulophyeis, the whole-natured 
ones—is characterized by shapelessness and wholeness combined. “First whole-
natured outlines (oulophyeis typoi) sprang up from the earth possessing a share 
of both, of water as of heat. These fire sent upward, wishing to reach what was 
similar to it; as yet they displayed neither the lovely framework of limbs (eraton 
demas meleōn), nor the voice and the organ that is native to men.”35 From the 
first animals, consisting of completely disconnected parts, not growing together 
(asymphyenta),36 through the exuberant hybrids to these shapeless, whole-
natured creatures (oulophyeis typoi), the succession of Empedocles’ zoogonies 
marks a progression toward bodily shape and completion, which is finally 
achieved in the forms (eidē) and colors (khroia) of the contemporary mortal be-
ings by means of the harmonization of Aphrodite.37 The key to the success of 
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31 DK 31 B 57 (= 10.13); Cf. P. Strasb. v. 302/cf. DK 31 B 20 line 1 (= 10.08), where we also 
hear about wanderings limbs, a process that involves the parts of all living beings, from bushes and 
fish to beasts and birds. Here, though, unlike in Aëtius’ testimony quoted above, the context is ex-
plicitly that of Strife’s rule. See below. 
32 See DK 31 B 60 (= 10.14) and DK 31 B 61 (= 10.15); cf. Guthrie 1965, 2: 203. See also Phys. 
2.198b31-2, where Aristotle mentions Empedocles’ “oxen with human heads” in the context of a 
larger discussion of whether fortune (tykhē) interferes with nature; ultimately he denies this possibil-
ity.  
33 Arist. Phys. 2.198b27. 
34 Simplicius clarifies the phenomenon of survival, explaining that in these newly formed bodies 
all parts fulfilled mutual needs, “the teeth cutting and chewing the food, the stomach digesting it and 
the liver turning it into blood” [In Phys. p. 371.33-372.9 (= 10.16)]. Ultimately, the members of the 
second zoogony survive by a process of symbiosis; see Longo (1999, 143), for whom, however, this 
process affects the other zoogonies as well.  
35 DK 31 B 62, lines 4-9 (= 10.19). 
36 DK 31 A 72 (= 10.12). 
37DK 31 B 71 (= 10.11). One should notice, in fact, that all first three zoogonies are, somewhat, 
characterized by formal lack. Indeed, the first zoogony is not only characterized by the lack of 
wholeness—its creatures are not holoklēroi—but the living parts themselves are defined by nega-
tion. The heads are without necks (anaukhenes), the arms naked, without shoulders (eunides ōmōn), 
and the eyes alone, impoverished of foreheads (metōpa), where the etymology for foreheads graphi-
cally presents this part of the body as “the space between the eyes” [DK 31 B 57 (= 10.13)]. On the 
other hand, creatures of second zoogony have shadowy limbs [DK 31 B 61 (= 10.15), see below], 
while those of the third ones lack the “lovely frame” of limbs [DK 31 B 62 (= 10.19), line 7]. On the 
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the fourth, and actual,38 zoogony—the only one that, according to Aëtius, is able 
to eat “thick nourishment” and procreate sexually—is the harmonious “growing 
together” (symphyein) of the animals’ bodily parts.39  
In his testimony, Aëtius does not synchronize the different generations of 
plants and animals with the cosmic phases to which they belong, whether under 
the increasing rule of Love or Strife. Scholars have filled this gap and assessed 
that the first two—the bare living parts and the mismatched “creatures of phan-
tasy”—develop under Love,40 the remaining ones—the “whole-natured” and 
those sexually differentiated—under Strife.41 The consideration of the cosmic 
phase in which a given generation occurs is crucial to understanding the physi-
cal nature and specificity of the living beings that belong to it. Indeed, Love and 
Strife, conceived as synergetic powers, have concrete, tangible effects on the 
creatures’ bodies, on their composition and articulation.42 Strife, whose creative 
role has been forcefully denied,43 is in fact responsible for the formal, and con-
sequently functional, articulation of animals’ bodies, for their sharp definition; 
the harmonization of the actual living beings by Love is possible only because 
of the concomitant and overpowering divisive effect of Strife.44 In other words, 
Love works successfully under outside pressure. Thus, it is significant that in 
describing the bodies of living beings at a stage when the rule of Love had much 
advanced and the power of Strife receded, Empedocles defines their limbs as 
“shadowy” (skiera gyia),45 that is, lacking definition. The progressively unifying 
power of Love in connection with the estrangement of Strife blurs bodies’ con-
-------------------------------------------- 
contrast between the living parts of the first zoogony and the whole-natured creatures of the fourth, 
see Bignone 1916, 566. 
38 In On Generation and Corruption Aristotle tells us that we live in the time of Strife (epi tou 
Neikous) (2.334a5). 
39 In fact, the harmonious bodily constitution that for Empedocles characterizes the last zoogony 
is manifested, in Aëtius’ testimony, by women’s shapeliness (eumorphia), as the factor triggering 
sexual desire and the process of sexual reproduction; see below p. 35; cf. also DK 31 B 64/ Plut. 
Quaest. Nat. 917c (= 10.21), a fragment cited by Plutarch in relation to sexual love, which likely 
presents man’s desire for intercourse as deriving from sight.  
40 On the basis of DK 31 B 61 (= 10.15) and comments by Aristotle and Simplicius (see p. 33, 
notes 33 and 34 above), Guthrie argues that the survivors of the second generation, the eidolopha-
neis, constitute a third stage in the period of increasing Love, omitted by Aëtius in his list of four 
generations (1965, 2: 203-6). 
41 As mentioned earlier, attribution of the zoogonies to distinct cosmic phases belongs to Bignone 
1916, 570-85; Guthrie 1965, 2: 200-211; Martin and Primavesi 1999, 54-7, 80-2, 95-7; and Sedley 
2007, 33-5, 40-1. 
42 On the “synergy” of Love and Strife in each period during which one of the two holds increas-
ing rule, see Bignone 1916, 584; Guthrie 1965, 2: 163-83; Wright 1981, 64, 67, 99; Kingsley 2002, 
385-90; Montevecchi 2010, 83-7.  
43 See p. 32, n. 27 above. 
44 On the creative role of Strife see also Wilcox (2001, 121) and Trépanier (2003, especially 18-
28). Further, Trépanier considers even the near perfection of blood in living beings as indicative of 
the presence of Strife, and concludes that “Strife must always be thought to be present within mortal 
bodies” (2003, 32-3). 
45 DK 31 B 61 (= 10.15). 
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tours and induces an excess and extravaganza of parts. Conversely, when Strife 
starts taking over and breaks the unity of the Sphere, the first zoogony it pro-
duces is still under the influence of Love. It consists in those living masses, who 
spring up from the earth under the effect of fire and whose shape lacks the 
“lovely frame of limbs” (eraton demas meleōn).46 This expression foreshadows 
the final zoogony, when sexual differentiation arises under the increased power 
of Strife and the “beautiful shape” (eumorphia) of women triggers men’s sexual 
desire. Trees, on the other hand, stand as “living fossils.” According to Aëtius, 
they are the first animals (zōa)47 to grow out of the earth in the first stage of 
Strife’s ascent, before the rise of the sun and the distinction between day and 
night. As such, they are contemporary of the whole-natured creatures of the 
third zoogony. For like these creatures, trees maintain a visceral connection with 
the earth, from which they receive their food. Further, they too combine the 
masculine and feminine sex,48 a biological feature that stemmed from the weak-
ness of Strife’s ascending power and, for Empedocles, may have been reflected 
in the graphic fullness of their shapes, especially when covered by leaves.49 The 
fact that trees continue to exist from the time of the first zoogony under the rule 
of Strife suggests that for other contemporary living beings the transition from 
third to fourth zoogony may have happened by means of “adaptation” when 
they gained the ability to eat solid food and procreate sexually. Likewise, it is 
plausible to envision some sort of continuity between the first and second zo-
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46 DK 31 B 62 (= 10.19). 
47 On trees as the first living beings to rise up out of the earth, see also Nicolaus of Damascus [de 
Plant. 57, p. 221 ed. Drossaart Lulofs (= 10.18)]. As Guthrie remarks, Aëtius’ use of zōa is likely a 
direct quotation from Empedocles, for whom “with his belief in the kinship of all life, there was no 
firm distinction” between trees and animals (Guthrie 1965, 2: 209). Interestingly, Empedocles’ view 
on the primeval nature of trees is echoed in Anaximander for whom, according to the doxography, 
the first organism were born from mud and surrounded by a thorny bark (phloios). Eventually the 
bark broke and the primeval living beings became “land animals” [DK 12 A 30 (= 03.03)]. For a 
discussion of the status of plants as animals in Presocratic thought, see chapter 4. 
48 See Nic. Dam. de Plant. 1.3, p. 127 Drossaart Lulofs/LM EMP. D250a (= 10.58) and DK 31 B 
70/Aët. 5.26.4 (= 10.54). Another biological trait shared by trees and the whole-natured is, in the 
mention of the rhizōmata that compose them, the lack, in each case, of air [cf. DK 31 B 62 (= 
10.19)]. According to Bignone, this omission occurs because air is a component of blood and flesh, 
which the creatures of the third zoogony do not yet have (1916, 581).  
49 This last assertion is an inference from the consistent attention Empedocles devoted to the 
forms of the living beings of all zoogonies; in fact, no explicit evidence supports it. We know, how-
ever, that Empedocles paid particular attention to the biological phenomena of trees and explained in 
physical terms their fructification; the shedding (phyllorrein) or, conversely ‘the keeping’ (parame-
nein) of their leaves (in the case of laurel, olive, and palm trees); and the flavor of their juices (khy-
moi) [DK 31 A 70 (= 10.54)]. Interestingly, the doxography preserves for us a couple of adjectives 
used by Empedocles to describe the ever-greenness of trees and their continuous fructification, re-
spectively empedophyllon and empedokarpa, which, as Repici remarks, refer to the substantive pe-
don, “that on which the foot steps” or “ground,” and indicate, as in the epic vocabulary, “something 
solidly planted in the ground” or “solidly installed” and therefore also “long-lasting” and “abiding” 
[see DK 31 B 77.78 (= 10.55, 10.56); Repici 2000, 74, 281, n. 86]. Yet, it is tempting to read into 
this temporal “stability” of fruit and leaves an allusion to trees’ “whole” and original physical and 
formal constitution. 
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ogony under the rule of Love when the bare parts of the first zoogony assembled 
into the hybrid bodies of the second, mentioned by Aristotle in Physics.50 Hence, 
we can reconcile the four zoogonies mentioned in Aëtius and Empedocles’ rela-
tive fragments with the double birth and double waning of fragment 17.51 
Recently a new interpretation has been given to the chronology of Empedo-
cles’ zoogonies. Sedley has argued for a separate anthropogony in the phase of 
ruling Strife; he considers most plant and animal species living in the time of 
Strife as derivative from the previous zoogony under Love. In this way, men and 
women would have a double origin, the first together with the other animals un-
der Love, the second alone under Strife.52 This interpretation, however, relies on 
two complementary assumptions. One takes the living masses (oulophyeis typoi) 
reductively as “a prelude of men and women” to the exclusion of the other liv-
ing beings, while the other claims a literal continuity of the zoogony under 
Love. A full discussion of Sedley’s interpretation falls outside the scope of this 
work. Here let a few points addressing the aforementioned assumptions suffice 
to keep Empedocles among the Presocratics who envisioned a common origin 
for humans and animals, which lies at the core of Presocratic inquiry into nature 
and is central to this book. The issue of continuity among zoogonies is crucial to 
understanding Empedocles’ cosmological system, and one has to assess whether 
he meant it literally or otherwise. Sedley argues for a literal continuity—the an-
imal species Pausanias sees are the same as those that emerged in the previous 
cosmic phase/s—on the basis of the Strasburg papyrus53 where Empedocles in-
vites Pausanias to see the “coming-together and unfolding of birth” under Love 
in the current forms of life. Yet this assertion does not necessarily mean that 
Pausanias sees the same living beings that had been formed under Love; rather 
he sees the same synergy of Love and Strife. In this respect, Trépanier considers 
that a zoogony formed under increasing Love still has “explanatory force” in the 
age of increasing Strife, given that both Love and Strife interact in each zo-
ogony, one unifying, the other dividing, regardless of who is ruling,54 and, one 
could add, reaching a balance that is conducive to forming successful living be-
ings. On the other hand, Empedocles is more concerned with the physical conti-
nuity of reality resulting, in each cosmic phase, from the combination and sepa-
ration of the elements than in a continuity of specific living beings, whose forms 
and identity we in fact see changing from zoogony to zoogony. Even between 
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50 In this case too the transition from first to second zoogony would be enabled by a phenomenon 
of symbiosis as for the survivors of the second zoogony (see above n. 34, but also the due qualifica-
tions on p. 37). 
51 Thus, unlike Sedley’s position accounted for below, continuity pertains to the living beings 
within the individual domain of Love and Strife rather than to the living beings across domains. 
52 2007, 35-49; Sedley 2005, 334-347.  
53 Ensemble a(ii), lines 25-8 Martin and Primavesi (= lines 295-96 Primavesi) (=10.07).  
54 2003, 46; cf. for a similar point, see also Gemelli Marciano, who stresses the coexistence of 
Love (Philia) and Strife (Neikos) in the cosmisc cycles and the ensuing zoogonies. Love binds while 
Strife releases (2005, 375-6). 
